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I. Introduction
“Every profound thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being
misunderstood,” wrote Friedrich Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil. “The latter may hurt his
vanity, but the former his heart, his sympathy, which always says: ‘Alas, why do you want to
have as hard a time as I did?’”1 Sure enough, there are few philosophers in the past one hundred
years who have been as misunderstood as Nietzsche. Having long been associated with antiSemitism and German militarism thanks to his Nazi sister’s posthumous assembly and promotion
of The Will to Power, Nietzsche was often immediately dismissed by scholars and students as a
reprehensible megalomaniac. The analytic2 Anglo-American traditions were especially
unforgiving during and after the Second World War. In 1945 Bertrand Russell decried Nietzsche
as a ranting Machiavellian literary figure who preferred evil over good. 3 “His followers have had
their innings,” said Russell, “but we may hope that it is coming rapidly to an end.”4 It wasn’t
until 1950, when Walter Kaufmann published the first edition of Nietzsche: Philosopher,
Psychologist, Antichrist, that Nietzsche’s posthumous reputation was radically reversed.5

1

BGE 290; I will use the following abbreviations to refer to Nietzsche’s works: HH = Human, All Too Human; GS
= The Gay Science; BGE = Beyond Good and Evil; GM = On the Genealogy of Morality; WP = The Will to Power;
EH = Ecce Homo; AOM = Assorted Opinions and Maxims; TI = Twilight of the Idols. All numbers refer to specific
passages in Nietzsche’s work, while all Roman numerals refer to books within a single work.
2 “Analytic” here refers to a particular style of doing philosophy, typically associated with Anglo-American
philosophers, which tends to (1) align itself with the natural sciences, (2) focus on conceptual precision and clarity,
and (3) make use of systems of logic to substantiate claims. While the term “analytic” typically connotes the work
and method of ordinary language philosophers and logical positivists (e.g. Quine, Russell, Wittgenstein), this paper
operates on the broadest sense of the term, while also acknowledging that the methodological division between
analytic and continental philosophy in scholarship today is not at all sharply defined.
3 Bertrand Russell, “Nietzsche,” in A History of Western Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1945),
762.
4 Ibid., 773.
5 Admittedly, Karl Jasper’s 1935 work Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical
Activity is probably considered the earliest challenge to “the Nietzsche legend”, and is undeniably indispensable to
Nietzsche scholars today. However, Kaufmann’s work is largely considered the primary gateway for AngloAmerican scholarship on Nietzsche.
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Kaufmann’s Nietzsche is a thinker who subverts traditional philosophical practices by ruthlessly
questioning foundations, and despite Nietzsche’s unusual aphoristic writing style, Kaufmann
argues that Nietzsche’s philosophy can be studied in an analytical way. Kaufmann is in no way
suggesting that Nietzsche’s work “fits” with specific analytical developments associated with
Wittgenstein and Russell; that is, Nietzsche does not suggest that ordinary language has some
special authority.6 Rather, he believed Nietzsche shared far more with the Anglo-American
analytic tradition (in the broadest sense) than previously thought. For instance, “Philosophers,
[Nietzsche] thought, should pay more attention to language - not in order to learn from its
implicit wisdom but rather to discover how from childhood we have been misled.”7 While this
small observation would imply that Nietzsche fits in better with continental schools of thought
(e.g. existentialism, psychoanalysis) Kaufmann is quick to point out that Nietzsche was “as close
to existentialism as he was to analytical philosophy,” and that he neither belongs to nor can be
claimed by either movement. In fact, Kaufmann says, “he may help to remind us how both
movements are one-sided and partial.”8
Even though Kaufmann’s work represents an important starting point for contemporary
Nietzsche studies, analytic scholars continue to struggle with the many paradoxes and
inconsistencies in Nietzsche’s books. Scholars argue over whether or not these inconsistencies
should be resolved, particularly the self-referential problem in his discussion on truth. Nietzsche
is known for vehemently attacking truth as an ideal: “The will to truth which will still tempt us to
many a venture, that famous truthfulness of which all philosophers so far have spoken with

6

Walter Kaufmann and Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Philosophy, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2013), 423.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
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respect - what questions has this will to truth not laid before us! [...] Suppose we want truth: why
not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance?” (BGE 1). This particular issue is arguably
one of the most important and difficult topics in all Nietzsche scholarship because many see it as
inextricably tied to the status of his other doctrines (e.g. perspectivism, will to power, eternal
return). To put it simply, if Nietzsche rejects truth as an ideal while also propounding that his
perspectivism or will to power are “true” things, then scholars are presented with a major
interpretive dilemma: Does Nietzsche mean to be inconsistent (e.g. that we might learn
something from his inconsistencies), or is the inconsistency a product of scholars misreading
what he says? The former takes Nietzsche’s inconsistency at face value, presenting his ideas and
method as radical challenges to traditional philosophical practices. On the other hand, the latter
implies the need for a more circumspect and rigorous analysis of his work, along with a whole
new set of questions: How should one approach Nietzsche? How can one resolve this
fundamental inconsistency? Where does one begin such an analysis? Martin Heidegger and
postmodern thinkers have found relative success with the former approach. Meanwhile, the
analytics, hoping to demonstrate Nietzsche’s relevance to contemporary discussions of truth and
epistemology, have struggled to identify a starting point for the latter approach. As a result,
analytic scholars often toss Nietzsche aside and leave him in the hands of literary theorists and
postmodernist thinkers. To quote John Richardson, “There is a widespread sense that he appeals
to a crude and impatient taste that will not survive a rigorous training in the field.”9
However, analytical approaches to Nietzsche have made a comeback in recent years, and
a number of scholars have presented strong arguments for the value of Nietzsche’s discussion of

9

John Richardson, “Introduction,” in Nietzsche, ed. John Richardson and Brian Leiter (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 7.
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truth and perspectivism in contemporary scholarship. Two such scholars, Maudemarie Clark and
Robert Lanier Anderson, make very strong cases for the consistency of Nietzsche’s position on
truth and his perspectivism. In this paper I will illustrate how each of these scholars overcame
the major inconsistency in Nietzsche’s epistemology by taking his concerns about the status of
philosophy seriously. The first section of this paper will outline what I identify as four key
interpretive issues for analytics in Nietzsche scholarship. I argue that these issues stem from
Nietzsche’s writing style and from his critique of the practice of philosophy in general. While
one will see that these two aspects of Nietzsche’s writing are directly at odds with traditional
analytic practices, they also illustrate his serious concerns about the dogmatic thinking he
observes among philosophers, an assertion that he defends throughout his works. I believe it is
possible to overcome these particular interpretive issues by taking his concerns into
consideration, and by highlighting how his concerns are compatible with analytic practices and
values. The second section presents a discussion of several strategies an analytic scholar can
employ to begin an analysis of Nietzsche’s thought without running into the issues presented in
the first section. The third section delineates the nuances of the self-referential problem in
Nietzsche’s critique of truth, leading into Clark’s and Lanier Anderson’s neo-Kantian
interpretations. Both of these scholars defend the neo-Kantian reading using one or more of the
strategies sketched in the second section. The final section concludes with my own analysis of
the self-referential problem, where I outline the necessary presuppositions one has to have in
order to identify the existence of an inconsistency in Nietzsche’s position on truth.

II. Lingering Issues for Analytic Scholars
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Nietzsche renounces a number of norms in contemporary scholarship, which heavily
impacts any attempt to resolve the self-referential problem in his critique of truth. What
Richardson and other philosophers may call “scholarly virtues,” Nietzsche would derisively call
“the prejudices of philosophers.”10 Given this fundamental opposition in values, Nietzsche’s
critique of scholars seems to render his own work unsuitable for scholarly analysis: if scholars
tried to approach Nietzsche with methods that he explicitly derides, they would risk falling into a
interpretive trap. Drawing from the respective works of Richardson and Kaufmann, I identify
four contemporary “scholarly virtues” to which Nietzsche is averse: conceptual clarity, logical
argumentation, philosophy’s growing affinity with the natural sciences, and schematic thinking.
“Good” scholarship begins with analyzing claims, which are presented as statements or
premises. In order to do this, however, a good scholar must first establish conceptual clarity, or
be able to provide clear and distinct definitions of concepts, which are then used to either
structure claims for analysis (or defense) or to deconstruct claims given in the text.11 Nietzsche is
clearly not a fan of this style of analysis. He criticizes philosophers for taking “common sense”
conceptual constructions for granted and ignoring a concept’s historicity and evolution in
meaning. In short, Nietzsche berates philosophers for lacking a historical sense:
All philosophers suffer from the same defect, in that they start with present-day man and
think they can arrive at their goal by analyzing him. Instinctively they let ‘man’ hover
before them as an aeternas veritas, something unchanging in all turmoil, a secure
measure of things. But everything the philosopher asserts about man is basically no more
than a statement about man within a very limited time span (HH 2).
Nietzsche also criticizes the “clear and distinct” criteria for conceptualization, which has
dominated philosophical thought since Descartes: “[...] this is a crude confusion: like simplex

10
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“On the Prejudices of Philosophers” just so happens to be the title of the first chapter of Beyond Good and Evil.
Richardson, “Introduction,” 2.

6
sigillum veri12 [...] Could it not be otherwise?” (WP 533). In his mind, despite the prima facie
rigor of conceptual analysis, philosophers haven’t been any more in control of their concepts
than their “pre-analytic” predecessors.13 We too, Nietzsche says, are “seduced by grammar”14
and infer “according to grammatical habit” (BGE 17). Our own meanings aren’t transparent to us
because we often fail to examine the biases and foundations of our own methodology. For
example, he explicitly discusses philosophers’ “conceptual ban on contradiction” in WP 516: “If
according to Aristotle, the law of contradiction is the most certain of all principles, if it is the
ultimate and most basic, upon which every demonstrative proof rests [...] then one should
consider more rigorously what presuppositions already lie at the bottom of it” (WP 516). While
most scholars general see Aristotle’s conceptual ban on contradiction as a helpful constraint,
Nietzsche views it as a stifling, unexplored given. It is difficult to study or explicate Nietzsche’s
conception of truth when he seems not only opposed to the analytic method, but also has no
interest in controlling his own meanings.15
This opposition to conceptual analysis leads right into his dislike of logical argumentation
in the Western intellectual tradition. Nietzsche himself rarely constructs his views as logical
arguments, and he is deeply suspicious of logic. Ironically (or perhaps, shrewdly), his claim
against Aristotle’s law of contradiction in WP 516 is in fact an argument for the subjectivity of
logical argumentation and truth:
Are the axioms of logic adequate to reality or are they a means and measure for us to
create reality, the concept ‘reality,’ for ourselves? - To affirm the former one would [...]
have to have a previous knowledge of being - which is certainly not the case. The

12

Simplicity is the seal of truth.
See BGE 20.
14 See BGE 16; Nietzsche repeats this phrase throughout his works.
15 Richardson, “Introduction,” 4.
13
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proposition therefore contains no criterion of truth, but an imperative concerning that
which should count as true (WP 516).
Nietzsche’s premises and logical constructions here16 could easily be dismissed as a series of
unproven premises and false dichotomies:17 his assertion that the law of contradiction is a
normative statement (as opposed to a descriptive statement) presupposes an argument against
metaphysical realism and a priori knowledge of reality, and yet Nietzsche does not provide us
with one for examination. If he makes no attempt to justify his own claims, or justifies them
incompletely or inconsistently, then how can scholars successfully defend what he says about
truth?
Nietzsche also criticizes philosophy’s growing solidarity with natural science. Citing
Newton, Voltaire, and Spinoza as examples, Nietzsche claims that the scientific revolution of the
past two centuries was (and is still) driven by values dating back not only to Christ, but also to
ancient Greek philosophy (GS 37).18 He asserts that the practice of philosophy “divorced itself
from science” as soon as it concerned itself almost exclusively with human happiness, while
science purports (albeit dishonestly) to pursue knowledge for its own sake (HH 6, HH 7).
However, as science and philosophy began to merge during the Enlightenment, philosophy
began to suffer as a discipline by losing sight of its concern for human conduct and welfare:
Nietzsche decries the natural sciences as philosophy “reduced to ‘theory of knowledge’” (BGE
204). Richardson, too, observes naturalism’s influence over philosophy today: “In assessing
philosophical claims, most will enforce the minimal condition that for a position to be viable it
16

I.e. Either the law of contradiction asserts that opposite attributes could not be ascribed to X (p) or it asserts that
opposite attributes should not be ascribed to X (q).
17 I.e. If p is true, then that implies metaphysical realism and the possibility of a priori knowledge of reality; p “is
certainly not the case” (~p), therefore q.
18 Nietzsche calls these values “the three errors”: (1) the desire to know the mind of God, (2) the belief that
knowledge and happiness are intimately related, and (3) the desire to be sinless (i.e. science is “selfless,” selfsufficient, and untainted by “the evil drives of humanity”).
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must be consistent with scientific findings.”19 Nietzsche would not be terribly pleased with this
development.
Finally, one of the biggest difficulties in providing a scholarly account of Nietzsche is his
aversion to systems and schematic thinking, which is here defined as an organized set of
doctrines, ideas or principles that work together as a unified whole.20 For Nietzsche, schematic
thinking looks suspiciously like dogmatic thinking. Kaufmann describes the similarity between
the two:
A system must necessarily be based on premises that by its very nature it cannot
question...The systematic thinker starts with a number of primary assumptions from
which he draws a net of inferences and thus deduces his system; but he cannot, from
within his system, establish the truth of his premises. He takes them for granted, and even
if they should seem ‘self-evident’ to him, they may not seem so to others. They are in that
sense arbitrary and reducible to the subjective make-up of the thinker.21
Nietzsche’s distrust of systems is not only exemplified by his repeated derisive statements,22 but
also by his aphoristic style of writing, which departs from the writing style of his immediate
predecessors.23 His aphorisms are at once the source of his popularity among lay audiences and
students, and also the primary source of frustration among scholars. “In Nietzsche’s books,” says
Kaufmann, “the individual sentences seem clear enough and it is the total design that puzzles
us.”24
On the whole, it appears that Nietzsche’s vision of “good” philosophy is certainly at odds
with what many consider good philosophy today: he dislikes conceptual analysis, criticizes the
use of logic, distrusts philosophy’s growing affinity with the natural sciences, and bemoans
19

Richardson, “Introduction,” 5.
This definition was taken from Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary (2015) entry for “system.”
21 Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 79.
22 E.g., “I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity” (TI I.26).
23 The German idealists immediately come to mind (Hegel, Schelling, Fichte).
24 Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 72.
20
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schematizing. The four issues discussed above only touch upon the numerous interpretive
problems in Nietzsche scholarship,25 but these four particular issues are interrelated. Scholars’
inability to systematize Nietzsche is rooted in his style of writing and his resistance to the
analytic standard of conceptual clarity, which undermines the scholar’s ability to construct and
analyze arguments using his concepts to evaluate the strength and soundness of his work. Just as
scientists refuse to build on weak theories, many analytic philosophers dismiss Nietzsche as
unsound and subsequently unworthy of further inquiry or supplementation. These four issues in
particular also highlight two major themes in Nietzsche’s thinking: a questioning of foundations
and an aversion to dogmatism. If scholars wish to study Nietzsche in a meaningful, analytical
way without “getting stuck in the mud,” then they must take these concerns very seriously.26 By
addressing Nietzsche’s concerns, I believe it is possible to overcome these issues, reconcile his
work with analytic scholarly interests, and explore how his critique of truth contributes to
analytical philosophical discussion.

III. Four Strategies for an Analytical Approach to Nietzsche
Returning to the first issue, Nietzsche’s primary reason for distrusting conceptual analysis
is the absence of a historical account of the meanings of concepts. It is not enough to simply
supply a definition by introspecting “what we mean.”27 While conceptual clarity is still necessary
to conduct our analysis, a scholar must now include a genealogy of meanings in his or her

25

For instance, since Nietzsche’s “rehabilitation” post-World War II, there has been much debate about how
scholars should treat his unpublished notebooks; see Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist,
77-78.
26 Even Nietzsche complains that people do not understand his work because the aphoristic style is not taken
seriously (GM Preface, 8).
27 Richardson, “Introduction,” 8.
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analysis: Nietzsche calls for “an absolute skepticism toward all inherited concepts” (WP 409).
While this does make analysis far more difficult, we can certainly appreciate Nietzsche’s call for
greater analytical rigor. However, the extent to which this can be done here is limited given the
size and scope of this paper, nor does Nietzsche give us an outline of what such an analysis
might look like, save for his work On the Genealogy of Morality.28 In light of these limitations, it
is still possible to apply a genealogy of meanings on a microcosmic scale: one can adopt “a
historical sense” to some degree by examining the historicity of Nietzsche’s own meanings. One
could begin such an examination by starting with a concept or topic in Nietzsche’s work, placing
it in its historical context, and following its development throughout his writings. For example,
in order for Nietzsche to embark on a fierce critique of truth, he himself would have had his own
initial conception of “truth” to begin with. This particular conception is informed by a historical
context, which prompted Nietzsche’s own vehement response, along with a subsequent
development of his own conception of truth. Through this approach, one may see Nietzsche as a
serious thinker engaging with the philosophical ideas of his time, and not just a mere culture
critic.
Nietzsche’s critique of argumentation is similar to his attitude towards conceptual
analysis; as such, it can be overcome in the same manner. Like conceptual analysis, Nietzsche is
not renouncing argumentation altogether. Rather, as Richardson says, Nietzsche “means to shift
the kind of argument we need and should want.”29 As we’ve seen, Nietzsche does occasionally
provide us with some logic-driven arguments, but his work is mostly comprised of historical
arguments. Nietzsche purposefully avoids working with logical proofs because he observes that
28

One example of a genealogical analysis of concepts that comes to mind might be Hannah Arendt’s The Life of the
Mind, which provides a rigorous analytical/historical treatment of how we think about “thinking.”
29 Richardson, “Introduction,” 9.
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philosophers exploit logical proofs as means of peering into a higher, “true” reality, when these
proofs actually describe, posit, and perpetuate a particular kind of reality for someone.30 A
philosopher that assumes the reality or “truth” of his or her premises and conclusions has not
only effectively imprisoned his or her thought into one system, but has also baptized his or her
prejudices as ultimate truths (BGE 5). In other words, “the thinker who believes in the ultimate
truth of his system, without questioning its presuppositions, appears more stupid than he is: he
refuses to think beyond a certain point; and this is, according to Nietzsche, a subtle moral
corruption.”31 For example, in GS 110, Nietzsche argues that we deceive ourselves into believing
that we’re more rational and objective than we really are as a result of the Platonic notion of
insensible, absolute truth. This notion gave rise to the belief that we ought to be dispassionate in
our pursuit of truth (i.e., if truth is dispassionate and un-egoistic, then it can only be perceived
dispassionately and un-egoistically). For instance, the Eleatics “had to misconstrue the nature of
the knower, deny the force of impulses in knowledge and generally conceive reason as a
completely free, self-originated activity” in order to satisfy their desire for a “tranquility or a sole
possession of sovereignty” (GS 110). While Nietzsche shared the Eleatic belief that the sensible
world was in a state of becoming, he was fiercely opposed to the manner in which they believed
it. In his mind, the Eleatics suggested that the sensible world was a mere appearance of an
underlying eternal being or substance, and they did not acknowledge “the force of impulses” that
played into the formation of this position.

30

For instance, “Behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, too, there stand valuations or, more
clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a certain type of life. For example, that the definite should be
worth more than the indefinite, and mere appearance worth less than ‘truth’ - such estimates might be, in spite of
their regulative importance for us, nevertheless mere foreground estimates, a certain kind of niaiserie which may be
necessary for the preservation of just such beings as we are. Supposing, that is, that not just man is the ‘measure of
things’ -” (BGE 3).
31 Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 81.
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Historical arguments like GS 110, while not as authoritative as logic-driven arguments,
have a structure and a “logic” that can be analyzed: they make specific claims using premises
and concepts that require clarification via a genealogy of meaning. One could say that his
concepts evolve along with his arguments. To reiterate, Nietzsche is imploring the philosopher to
have a historical sense, to not presume the “fixed realness” of concepts and instead be prepared
“to declare himself against his previous opinion and to mistrust anything that wishes to become
firm in us” (GS 296). A well-trained philologist, Nietzsche was critical of the nostalgic attitudes
of his fellow academics, and strongly believed that every past was worth condemning.32 Just as
historians ought to readily revisit the meaning of historical narratives to reach a new
understanding of the present, philosophers, too, should reexamine their conceptual foundations to
better understand the nature of their present attitudes. Although the size and scope of this paper
limits how much analysis can be done, one can still provide an account of how Nietzsche’s
arguments developed over time.
Nietzsche’s attitude towards science is also more compatible with analytic attitudes than
originally thought. Richardson notes that both Nietzsche and the analytics share a strong
naturalizing impulse: they both share a desire to do away with religious dogma and
supernatural/”pneumatic” explanations of phenomena (HH 8). In a way, Nietzsche wanted
philosophy to become scientific, “only he had in mind the ‘gay science’ of fearless experiment
and the good will to accept new evidence and to abandon previous positions, if necessary.”33
This playful “experimentalism” that Nietzsche advances is both endorsed and exemplified by his

32

For an extensive discussion of Nietzsche’s call for a critical view of history, see “On the Use and Disadvantage of
History for Life” (1874).
33 Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 86.
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own aphoristic writing style.34 Kaufmann describes Nietzsche’s aphorisms, and his way of
thinking, as “monadologic”: each aphorism is a self-sufficient microcosm of meaning, and these
microcosms, when grouped together, create a “pluralistic universe” that makes sense in part, but
not necessarily in the whole.35 Nietzsche himself admitted that the scientific spirit is powerful in
the part, not in the whole (HH 6). Such a description sheds some light on Nietzsche’s
perspectivism (which we shall address later) as well as his attitude towards systems.
One could argue that the absence of an apparent system or schema is hardly a reason to
reject Nietzsche altogether. He is not the only thinker to not take a systematic approach. As
Kaufmann observes, “Schelling and Hegel, Spinoza and Thomas Aquinas had their systems; in
Kant’s and Plato’s case the word is far less applicable; and of the many important philosophers
who very definitely did not have systems one need only mention the pre-Socratics.”36 A lack of a
system does not necessarily make him unworthy of our attention. If anything, one could actually
describe his resistance to systems as informative. As we’ve seen in his aphorisms, Nietzsche is
not what we would call a systematic thinker: he does not deduce a system from a set of
unquestionable assumptions like Spinoza,37 nor does he immediately build upon any conclusions
or observations made in each aphorism, as one would expect in traditional argumentation.38
Rather, unimpeded by presuppositions, he engages in a kind of free play. For that reason,
Kaufmann asserts, it may be helpful to view Nietzsche as a “problem-thinker”:
Perhaps it is the most striking characteristic of ‘dialectical’ thinking from Socrates to
Hegel and Nietzsche that it is a search for hidden presuppositions rather than a quest for
solutions. The starting point of such a ‘dialectical’ inquiry is not a set of premises but a
34

Alexander Nehamas explores this assertion in depth in Nietzsche: Life as Literature (1985).
Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 75.
36 Ibid., 79.
37 Ibid., 82.
38 Ibid., 75.
35

14
problem situation - and Plato, of course, excelled at giving a concrete and dramatic
setting to this. In the problem situation premises are involved, and some of these are
made explicit in the course of inquiry. The result is less a solution of the initial problem
than a realization of its limitations: typically, the problem is not solved but ‘outgrown.’39
Like schematic thinkers, problem-thinkers begin with a set of premises, but those
premises only emerge upon encountering a problem, hence the problem-thinker does not assume
the absolute truth of his or her premises, nor does he or she attempt to establish them as true. The
premises are only true “for the sake of argument,” since they only appear in relation to the
problem at hand. In other words, like each of Plato’s dialogues, each of Nietzsche’s aphorisms
(and sequence of aphorisms, like those in Thus Spoke Zarathustra) can be thought of as thought
experiments. Additionally, the great number of aphorisms (experiments) in Nietzsche’s work
tells us something important: it reflects his belief that making only one experiment, or adhering
to only one system in a dogmatic fashion, would be self-limiting. In that sense, one could say that
all dogmatic thinking is schematic, but not all schematic thinking is dogmatic. There is a
difference between adhering to a system and playing with many systems, and Nietzsche clearly
endorses the latter: “Deeply mistrustful of the dogmas of epistemology, I loved to look now out
of this window, now out of that; I guarded against settling down with any of these dogmas,
considered them harmful - and finally: is it likely that a tool is able to criticize its own fitness?”
(WP 410).40 While the systems Nietzsche uses come and go, the act of experimenting itself
remains constant throughout his works.41

39

Ibid., 82.
See also EH III.4: “[...] I have many stylistic possibilities - the most multifarious art of style that has even been at
the disposal of one man.”
41 AOM 128 hints at this underlying unity: “Do you think that this work must be fragmentary because I give it to
you in fragments?”
40
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Thus far we have established a few ways in which scholars may approach Nietzsche’s
work analytically. Firstly, we can examine the genealogy of his concepts on a microcosmic level
and follow their development. Secondly, we may worry less about his issues with the natural
sciences and argumentation, so long as we carefully and honestly consider the origins of “the
scientific spirit” and why we are so strongly persuaded by analytic arguments. Thirdly, instead of
viewing Nietzsche’s work as a system that has yet to be articulated as such, we may consider
each of his aphorisms (and collections of aphorisms) as experiments. While his experiments are
stylistically multifarious, they do have a development: we can potentially track when and where
a particular problem or system has been “outgrown,” to borrow Kaufmann’s phrase. So, an
analytical approach to Nietzsche’s conception of truth and subsequent perspectivism may look
something like the following. To begin, one can establish Nietzsche’s initial conception of truth
in its historical context by giving an account of (1) how he describes it and (2) how it relates to
the historical philosophical discussion of truth. This kind of conceptual clarity satisfies
Nietzsche’s call for a “historical sense” while also satisfying the analytical scholar’s need for
clarity to conduct an analysis. One then follows this concept throughout his works by examining
how he “experiments” with this conception of truth, along with a subsequent development of his
own epistemological theory. The next section of this paper will examine how a developmental
reading establishes greater clarity of Nietzsche’s own concepts and opens up new doors in
Nietzsche scholarship, particularly for those interested in understanding Nietzsche’s
perspectivism and resolving one of the major problems in his discussion of truth. 42

42

The following section draws heavily from a paper of mine (“Nietzsche’s Perspectivism and the Neo-Kantian
Solution to the Self-Referential Problem”) written in Fall 2013 under the supervision of Dr. Craig Vasey.
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IV. Clark, Lanier Anderson, and The Neo-Kantian Solution
As we have seen, analytic scholars have had a difficult time interpreting Nietzsche: he
embraces self-contradiction and his concepts elude workable definitions. Analytic philosophers
have either struggled to resolve his inconsistencies or have urged their fellow academics to
completely abandoned him altogether, whereas postmodernist interpreters (e.g. Heidegger,
Derrida, Foucault) have rushed in where the analytics have feared to tread. However, in the past
twenty years or so, we have seen a renewed analytic philosophical interest in his work as
scholars find new ways of interpreting Nietzsche’s thought, many of which were outlined in the
previous section. In this section, I will discuss the ways in which two scholars have successfully
used these strategies to go about resolving what is called the “self-referential inconsistency” in
Nietzsche’s discussion of truth. Both Clark and Lanier Anderson take on a neo-Kantian
interpretation, arguing that Nietzsche’s rejection of noumenal truth and representationalism is
vital to making sense of his perspectivism and escaping the inconsistency. The neo-Kantian
solution simultaneously highlights Nietzsche’s naturalistic and skeptical tendencies, and clarifies
Nietzsche’s critique of truth, acting as a springboard for future Nietzsche scholarship and general
analytical debates on the nature of knowledge. Kaufmann was arguably the first scholar to take
on a neo-Kantian interpretation of Nietzsche,43 which invited scholars to reconsider Nietzsche’s
value in epistemological discussions. According to Clark,
Kaufmann’s Nietzsche denies the possibility of transcendent or metaphysical truth, which
would be correspondence to the way things are in themselves, but affirms the existence of
empirical truth. To affirm the existence of truth is simply to say that some statements,
propositions, sentences, or utterances are true. According the Kaufmann’s interpretation,
then, Nietzsche denies that any metaphysical statements are true but accepts many
empirical statements as true. Kaufmann can deny any inconsistency between Nietzsche’s
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theory and his practice, for he interprets Nietzsche as putting forward his own views,
including the doctrines of eternal recurrence and will to power, as empirical truths.44
Despite the helpfulness of Kaufmann’s basic neo-Kantian approach (which contrasted
Heidegger’s interpretation at the time),45 there are a number of problems with his formulation.
Firstly, if one interprets Nietzsche’s doctrines as “straightforward claims about the nature of
reality, as claims that are supposed to correspond with reality,”46 then it seems that Nietzsche
still adheres to the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth, even though he repeatedly
derides it.47 Secondly, it fails to explain the many passages in which Nietzsche outright denies
the existence of truth in general. Clark believes that the neo-Kantian interpretation is still tenable,
but requires a more nuanced approach than Kaufmann’s, arguing that (1) Nietzsche does reject
the thing-in-itself, but not truth itself, and (2) how that does not undermine his own practice.48
Clark defends Nietzsche as a neo-Kantian using one of the strategies outlined in the first section:
an evolutionary reading of Nietzsche’s conception of truth. It is important to note that while
Kaufmann’s and Richardson’s observations on Nietzsche heavily implied the need for a
historical sense, Kaufmann himself did not attend to the evolution of Nietzsche’s own meanings.
I would argue that Clark is the first scholar to take the need for a developmental reading very
seriously, which I will argue makes her work one of the more successful analytical approaches to
Nietzsche in recent history. Her developmental reading of Nietzsche’s conception of truth
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provides what could be called a genealogy of Nietzsche’s own meanings, which culminates in a
clear understanding of Nietzsche’s later conception of truth and a starting point for seriously
examining not only his perspectivism, but his other doctrines as well. Clark’s goal is to show that
Nietzsche’s early denial of truth is a product of his initial acceptance of the metaphysical
correspondence theory, and that somewhere along the way he recognized the internal
inconsistency of his early position.
Lanier Anderson’s work corroborates Clark’s analysis, arguing that Nietzsche’s mature
perspectivism rejects metaphysical realism and metaphysical correspondence. However,
perspectivism is not to be equated with relativism. Just like how the compatibility of alternative
visual perspectives depends on a notion of objects independent from their visual appearances, so
too do differing perspectives depend on a notion of objects independent from perspective: we
need to be talking about the same thing in order to express agreement or disagreement about the
nature of the thing.49 Without this notion, perspectivism becomes pure relativism or subjective
idealism, which brings with it a whole host of different problems for Nietzsche’s thought, and
makes it difficult for us to take him seriously. On the other hand, the notion of perspectiveindependent objects looks suspiciously like metaphysical realism, which puts Nietzsche’s
perspectivism back into a paradoxical position. In order to find a way around the self-referential
problem, there must be some middle ground between metaphysical realism and relativism.50
In summary, this section examines how Clark employs one of the major interpretive
strategies in the second section to resolve a major inconsistency in Nietzsche’s thought, and how
Lanier Anderson’s analysis highlights how the instrumental and pluralistic nature of his
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perspectivism generates an internal logic that dissolves the self-referential problem. My own
brief interpretation offers reasons for the internal consistency of Nietzsche’s perspectivism and
the subsequent resolution of the self-referential problem, and analyzes the presuppositions
underlying the formation of the self-referential problem itself. This interpretation will draw from
Clark and Lanier Anderson’s interpretations, and I will focus on works that establish what Clark
designates as Nietzsche’s “mature position on truth,” such as The Gay Science and Beyond Good
and Evil, as well as selections from The Will to Power.

IV.i Breaking Down the Self-Referential Problem
In his 1873 work On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense, Nietzsche presents us with
one of his first sustained discussions on the nature of truth, which he summarily characterizes as,
“illusions which we have forgotten are illusions,”51 amounting to “a denial that any human belief
is, or could be, true.”52 Perspectivism is the claim that all knowledge is perspectival, or dictated
by perspective.53 Leading theorists, such as Brian Leiter, Clark, and Lanier Anderson interpret
perspectivism as, “an epistemological thesis, roughly, the idea that no interpretations of reality
are privileged, and that there is no knowledge unconditioned by particular, idiosyncratic
interests.”54 If this is in fact Nietzsche’s position (or at least a fair summary of his position), then
it proves to be quite problematic. To say that truth is an illusion, or to deny truth altogether, is
akin to making the statement, “truth is false”: if that statement is true, then the statement is also
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false, since there is at least one truth (i.e. that there is no truth). If the statement is false, then that
means that there is some truth. Steven D. Hales describes the self-referential problem this way:
What status should we ascribe to his [Nietzsche’s] own claims? Does he claim to know
them? Are they true? If neither, and Nietzsche is just presenting some random
speculations that he thinks are no better than a midnight dorm-room bull session, then it
is hard to see why we should take him seriously. On the other hand, if Nietzsche is
asserting his views as true things that he knows, then this undermines his own contention
that no interpretation of reality is privileged.55
One way to escape the paradox is to distinguish different kinds of truth, such as noumenal
truth (i.e. truth that exists independently of the senses) and phenomenal truth (i.e. truth as it
appears to the senses). In other words, the self-referential problem arises as a result of an
oversimplification of Nietzsche’s position on truth. Clark and Lanier Anderson agree that
Nietzsche specifically targets noumenal truth in his critique. However, Lanier Anderson offers
another solution in addition to the first: “Nietzsche’s arguments for perspectivism depend on
‘internal reasons,’ which have force not only in their own perspective, but also within the
standards of alternative perspectives.”56
The neo-Kantian interpretation of Nietzsche’s position on truth (and solution to the selfreferential problem) focuses on the rejection of noumenal truth. This interpretation largely
depends on the elaboration of the following concepts: metaphysical realism, metaphysical
correspondence, representationalism, and the falsification thesis. Metaphysical realism is the
notion that “the world is made up of a fixed totality of determinate, theory-independent objects,
and there is a single true description of the world”57 In other words, metaphysical realism holds
that there is an absolute, noumenal, or metaphysical truth. Metaphysical realists contend that a
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belief or theory can only be true if the posited theory aligns with the single true description of the
world. This is known as the doctrine of metaphysical correspondence. Representationalism falls
in line with metaphysical realism, purporting that what we experience is not the metaphysical or
“real world” itself, but only a representation of it. Essentially, metaphysical realism argues that
phenomena (i.e., what we experience through the senses) are actually representations of
noumena, or things that exist independently of the senses. We cannot directly experience
noumena, but their nature can be inferred through the experience of phenomena. Finally, the
falsification thesis holds that “all of our beliefs, theories, and sentences falsify and distort
reality.”58 Fundamentally, a metaphysical realist holds that all of our knowledge is rooted in our
experience of phenomena, but since phenomena are merely representations of things-inthemselves (or noumena), our so-called knowledge of the world (i.e. our beliefs, theories, and
sentences) is inevitably imperfect, which would mean that our knowledge “falsifies” reality. This
particular idea is an object of contention among Nietzsche scholars. If Nietzsche claims that truth
is, “a moveable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms,”59 then that would
suggest that he subscribes to the falsification thesis, which would also mean he subscribes to
metaphysical realism to some degree. But because Nietzsche has repeatedly derided
metaphysical realism in many of his works, he would be contradicting himself if he accepted the
falsification thesis while embracing perspectivism. Clark purports that Nietzsche eventually
came to reject the falsification thesis, and by rejecting the thesis, Nietzsche is able to escape the
self-referential problem.
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IV.ii Clark’s Developmental Reading
Clark’s work attempts to resolve the self-referential problem by reconstructing
Nietzsche’s evolving account of truth through a developmental reading of his works. She argues
that while it may appear that Nietzsche supported the falsification thesis while simultaneously
criticizing metaphysical realism, he ultimately took up a neo-Kantian position (i.e. “the rejection
of transcendent or metaphysical truth as a contradiction in terms”)60 in his later works, such as
Gay Science and Beyond Good and Evil. In On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense,
Nietzsche seems to strongly defend the notion that what we call truth is a social convention that
has its origins in metaphor. Metaphors, he believes, fail to adequately mirror the world.61 The
idea that truths are metaphors indicates a sort of separation between the description of the
empirical thing and the thing-in-itself, but the two are nevertheless somehow mysteriously and
intuitively connected to each other. This means that Nietzsche subscribes to the notion of truth as
correspondence to something, but he bemoans our failure to “get at” the original entity (i.e. the
thing-in-itself). However, Nietzsche’s 1878 work, Human, All Too Human, marked a transition
in his thought: he begins to focus less on the notion of correspondence and more on a naturalistic
explanation of morals and historical philosophy (HH 1, HH 10). Clark points out that Nietzsche
takes a more cautious stance to metaphysical realism, admitting that he cannot deny the
possibility of a metaphysical world: “It is true that there might be a metaphysical world; the
absolute possibility of it can hardly be disputed. We view all things through the human head and
cannot cut this head off; though the question remains, what of the world would still be there if it
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had been cut off?” (HH 9). Nietzsche is implying that even if the metaphysical world did exist, it
still “would not provide answers that we could find cognitively useful” because “the
metaphysical world differs radically from the empirical.”62 Clark sums up Nietzsche’s position
up to this point: “We cannot rule out the possibility that the truth differs radically from our best
theory, but we cannot know whether or not it does. This means that we cannot know whether or
not our truths correspond to things-in-themselves or possess metaphysical truth.”63 A skeptical
stance on metaphysical truth marks a significant transition from his outright dismissal of truth in
the general sense, which shows us that his initial thoughts on truth have become more nuanced.
By the time he got around to publishing Gay Science in 1882, Clark purports that
Nietzsche finally adopted the neo-Kantian stance, rejecting the conceivability of the thing-initself and the falsification thesis:
What is ‘appearance’ to me now! Certainly not the opposite of some essence – what
could I say about any essence except name the predicates of its appearance! Certainly not
a dead mask that one could put on an unknown x and probably also take off x! To me,
appearance is the active and living itself (GS 54).
If appearance is the “active and living itself,” then it would appear that Nietzsche no longer sees
truth as metaphor or metaphysical correspondence: the “space” implied by the separation
between the description of the empirical thing and the thing-in-itself has collapsed, and
appearance and essence have become one and the same. On the other hand, in that same passage,
Nietzsche still cannot help but cling to the idea that the objects of consciousness are
representations, as he describes himself awaking in the middle of a dream, “but only to the
consciousness that I am dreaming and that I must go on dreaming lest I perish – as the

62
63

Clark, “The Development of Nietzsche’s Later Position on Truth,” 61.
Ibid.

24
sleepwalker has to go on dreaming in order to avoid falling down” (GS 54). This puts Nietzsche
in a difficult position:
If life is a dream, the objects of consciousness exist only as representations; they have no
existence except in relation to the knower/dreamer. In that case, Nietzsche has only two
options: Either there are independently existing things which cannot be direct objects of
knowledge or only representations exist. The first option commits him to the thing-initself; the second amounts to subjective idealism.64
So long as Nietzsche holds on to representationalism, Nietzsche cannot be a neo-Kantian, and his
critique of truth remains inconsistent. But Clark contends that Nietzsche solves this problem by
arguing that knowledge is perspectival, not representational.65 This would indicate that there is a
difference between perspective and representation, and yet Nietzsche describes his perspectivism
through visual metaphor, which would seem problematic, since visual metaphors deal directly
with representations. How can we take his perspectivism seriously when it still seems to resort to
representationalism and falsification? There must be a serious disanalogy between visual
metaphor and perspective in order for Nietzsche to take on the neo-Kantian stance in earnest, and
thereby resolve the self-referential problem.
The most plausible answer to this conundrum, Clark argues, is that Nietzsche is saying
that our knowledge doesn’t falsify metaphysical reality (for that would presuppose metaphysical
correspondence and a belief in a metaphysical reality), but it does falsify what Nietzsche calls
“the chaos of sensations.”66 In WP 569, Nietzsche neatly outlines that our psychological
perspective is determined by the following:
(1) that communication is necessary, and that for there to be communication something
has to be firm, simplified, capable of precision... For it to be communicable, however, it
must be experienced as adapted, as ‘recognizable’ The material of the senses adapted by
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the understanding, reduced to rough outlines, made similar, subsumed under related
matters. Thus the fuzziness and chaos of sense impressions are, as it were, logicized;
(2) the world of ‘phenomena’ is the adapted world which we feel to be real. The reality
lies in the continual recurrence of identical, familiar, related things in their logicized
character...
(3) the antithesis of this phenomenal world is not ‘the true world,’ but the formless
unformulable world of the chaos of sensations -- another kind of phenomenal world, a
kind ‘unknowable’ for us (WP 569).
This, says Clark, presents a naturalized version of Kant’s theory of knowledge (i.e., a neoKantian theory of knowledge), and would explain why Nietzsche continued to maintain the
falsification thesis in BGE and GS: “If the data of sensation constitute reality, the a priori
features the brain’s organization imposes on sensations falsify reality, making it to appear to
have features it does not actually possess.”67 In that case, the rest of Nietzsche’s dream metaphor
in GS 54 makes more sense, and suggests the intersubjective nature of knowledge as informed by
a plurality of perspectives: “among all these dreamers, even I, the ‘knower’, am dancing my
dance; that the one who comes to know is a means of prolonging the earthly dance [...] and that
the sublime consistency and interrelatedness of all knowledge may be and will be the highest
means to sustain [...] the mutual comprehension of all dreamers.” However, the status of his
perspectivism remains in question: we still don’t know whether or not Nietzsche claims
perspectivism to be “a true thing that he knows.” If it is, then he has privileged his perspective
over all others without sufficient qualification; if it isn’t, then what about his perspectivism
prevents us from dismissing it as the product of intellectual capriciousness?

IV.iii. Lanier Anderson’s Naturalistic Reading
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Although Nietzsche’s use of visual metaphor is often misleading and distracting, Lanier
Anderson argues that we must take Nietzsche’s visual metaphor on perspective seriously in order
to resolve the self-referential problem in Nietzsche’s perspectivism. In its most basic sense,
Nietzsche’s perspectivism is best understood in terms of our visual perspective. However, as
illustrated in Clark’s argument and in WP 569, his visual metaphors are meant to create a parallel
between visual perspective and cognitive perspective: Nietzsche wants to emphasize the impact
of the latter.68 Perspectives organize our experience in accordance to a self-posited scheme.
These schemes are composed of our basic concepts, such as, “cause, sequence, for-each-other,
relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, motive, and purpose” (BGE 21). These schemes
help us organize the world. According to Lanier Anderson, Nietzsche did not believe that our
concepts came from a priori universals or “transcendental preconditions” as Plato and Kant
asserted; rather, we adopt them “because of their contingent (and potentially variable) relation to
our needs, interests, and values.”69 We draw upon these self-posited concepts or schemes to
“construct” the phenomenal world: “As soon as we see a new picture, we immediately construct
it with the help of all the old experiences we have had, depending on the degree of our honesty
and justice” (GS 114).
It is important to note that one aspect of the visual metaphor does not fit with his
perspectivism. While different visual perspectives can be compatible, cognitive perspectives are
not always compatible: all visual perspectives conform to optical laws, but to assume that all
cognitive perspectives conform to “epistemic optics” is to assume metaphysical realism, which
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Nietzsche believes we cannot possibly justify.70 Additionally, we can choose among cognitive
perspectives to suit our interests and purposes. For example, when we look at the classic “rabbitduck illusion,” we can look at the picture as a rabbit or a duck, but we cannot see both
simultaneously; in order to see the rabbit, we must “un-see” the duck.71 In this sense, in order to
perceive anything, we must inevitably suppress certain schemas or perspectives. This idea draws
a nice parallel between perspectivism and Nietzsche’s will to power.
With regard to the self-referential problem, Lanier Anderson observes that since
perspectivism “is only one view (by its own standards), it seems that the perspectivist cannot
offer any principled theoretical grounds for preferring her epistemology over its dogmatic
competitors.”72 According to metaphysical realists (the “dogmatic competitors”), a belief or
theory can be true only if it corresponds to things as they are in themselves. If that is the case,
then, “the perspectivist cannot offer any such claim, on pain of contradicting her own
view…perspectivism prevents its adherents from offering any reasons in its defense which would
be acceptable to their main opponents.”73 Essentially, because of the incompatibility of cognitive
perspectives, perspectivists cannot possibly assert that perspectivism is “correct” (or has
privilege over other perspectives) without contradicting itself. However, there is one
argumentative strategy a perspectivist could employ, according to Lanier Anderson: a
perspectivist like Nietzsche must admit that conceptual schemes are not “mutually isolated, selfsufficient wholes.”74 Perspectives often overlap with one another: they are not wholly
incompatible, otherwise we would not express any form of agreement, let alone communicate
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agreement (i.e. “I see what you mean”). For instance, Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity in GM
appeals to his beliefs in spiritual autonomy and psychological health, which the Christian ascetic
ideal supposedly compromises by “turning people against themselves” as sinners (GM III.20).75
But Nietzsche argues that most people ought to be Christians since for them the ascetic ideal “is
an artifice for the preservation of life” (GM III.13). Lanier Anderson argues that Nietzsche had
to assume that his arguments would hold no force for them, since his perspective and their
perspective are incommensurable. However, Nietzsche’s arguments are commensurable with
“those Christians or Deists who, like Kant or Rousseau, do hold the values of autonomy,
integrity, and self-realization that Nietzsche thinks are undermined by the Christian morality.”76
In this way, these shared values allow for the transition over from the rabbit to the duck,
signifying the possibility of a perspectival shift and the recognition that Christianity is not “the
way” but is one of many perspectives. And so, Nietzsche has opened the door for others “to
employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge” (GM
III.12).
Additionally, much like how Nietzsche criticizes Christianity but admits that “the ideas
of the herd should rule in the herd” (WP 287), a perspectivist can argue that while all
perspectives are equally perspectives, not all perspectives are equally good or well-suited to
certain purposes. The value of a perspective depends on the purpose in adopting it. To borrow
Lanier Anderson’s example, a microscope is helpful when we want to view small objects, but is
rendered useless when we want to view a lake from far away.77 Even the language used in this
example indicates the relationship between knowledge and our interests. Perspectivism, as an
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alternative perspective or cognitive scheme to metaphysical realism, can provide another way
(perhaps a more expansive way) of looking at the world, and provide a more nuanced
explanation of the relationship between our desires and how we think about the world: “its
conceptual foundations can provide a better interpretation of our cognitive practices than the
views he saw as chief alternatives, viz., metaphysical realism, and Kant’s transcendental
idealism.”78 Again, we don’t have to only see the rabbit in the rabbit-duck drawing; Nietzsche
has given us the “duck” alternative.
Both Clark’s and Lanier Anderson’s arguments take up a basic neo-Kantian
interpretation. Although Lanier Anderson’s approach does not include a developmental reading
of Nietzsche’s position on truth like Clark, each of them claim that Nietzsche’s stance on truth is
an attack on metaphysical realism, noumenal truth and metaphysical correspondence. However,
Clark and Lanier Anderson seem to differ in describing the manner in which Nietzsche rejects
metaphysical realism. Clark’s work aims to portray Nietzsche’s stance in his later works as his
“mature” position on truth, which exclusively focuses on a rejection of metaphysical realism.
Clark’s developmental reading clarifies his position on truth, and her argument operates on the
notion that Nietzsche did have a solid neo-Kantian stance once the difficulties with the dream
metaphor/perspective analogy were resolved. Lanier Anderson’s work investigates the
naturalistic aspects of Nietzsche’s thought, and for the most part, arrives at the same conclusion
as Clark, while also highlighting the experimentalist nature of his perspectivism. However, his
argument softens Nietzsche’s attitude toward metaphysical realism. While Clark’s Nietzsche
outright rejects metaphysical realism, Lanier Anderson’s Nietzsche does not believe that
metaphysical realism is defensible, but he still acknowledges its status as a perspective; what he
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primarily takes issue with is that metaphysical realism is a perspective that deals in absolutes,
which does not provide, in his mind, the best interpretation of the world or cognition.79 Both
arguments do claim that Nietzsche was neither making an absolute claim about the existence of
truth in any form, nor was he claiming privilege to his perspectivism; rather, Nietzsche was
ultimately rejecting foundationalism, inviting us to examine the non-foundational and naturalistic
nature of knowledge, and offering a better (as opposed to the best) explanation of knowledge
acquisition.80

V. Thoughts on the Self-Referential Problem
I would argue that there are problems with the self-referential problem itself that go
beyond the oversimplification of the word “truth.” Firstly, in order to arrive at the self-referential
problem, the statement “truth is false” or “there is no truth” must be tested for internal
consistency (i.e. whether or not the truthiness or falseness of the statement results in a paradox).
It’s fair to say that consistency is valued in the philosophical profession (particularly among the
analytics): an inconsistent argument is typically thrown out, not taken seriously, or reworked
according to other arguments in order to conform to a particular interpretation.81 Philosophers
also largely operate on predicates and assertions. One could argue that Nietzsche’s position is not
paradoxical but simply incompatible with a perspective that privileges logical consistency above
all else, hence the reason why postmodernists and deconstructionists discuss Nietzsche’s
conception of truth with little self-referential difficulty. The analytic philosopher’s need for
coherence dominates how he or she analyzes particular doctrines. If he or she is able to say that
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“Nietzsche is coherent,” then what Nietzsche says has suddenly gained a certain value within the
scholarly community. But does the value of Nietzsche’s doctrines come from the content of each
of those doctrines, or the fact that they appear to be (or have been rendered) coherent? Can we
even separate the two? As Nietzsche says, “the need, not to ‘know,’ but to subsume, to
schematize, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation” overrides everything (WP 515);
analytic philosophers may want to honestly reflect on what it is they’re doing and why.
Moreover, Paul Horwich observes that the tendency among philosophers to fixate on statements
such as “X is true” produce the misguided inference that truth has some hidden nature waiting
for our discovery: “Unlike most other predicates, ‘is true’ is not used to attribute to certain
entities (i.e. statements, beliefs, etc.) an ordinary sort of property - a characteristic whose
underlying nature will account for its relations to other ingredients of reality.”82 Using truth as a
predicate, in this sense, may indicate an internalized, unconscious adherence to some form of
correspondence theory, which may tempt many to internalize a metaphysical correspondence
theory of truth, in which case Nietzsche has sufficient reason to be suspicious of logic. Yet again,
Nietzsche could come back and say to us that regardless of our intentions, we are unwittingly
“seduced by grammar.” The self-referential problem could easily be dismissed as a pseudoproblem rooted in the manner in which we habitually describe truth.
Secondly, cognitive perspectives are, by their very nature, bound to be incompatible:
representations are only compatible if they are given from the same (or at least very similar)
cognitive perspective. In other words, Nietzsche’s perspective (or any perspective, for that
matter) is only totally compatible with itself. While the conclusion is circular, it also signifies
that Nietzsche’s statement is internally consistent as a perspective, as Lanier Anderson asserts,
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but is internally inconsistent as a statement or conviction employed in a logical argument. A
perspective in this case cannot be held as a conviction, because that would make perspectivism,
as a perspective, privileged or absolute, which would lead to a contradiction. If Nietzsche’s
position on truth is reworked and formulated as the statement/conviction “there is no truth,” or
the question “Is it true that there is no truth?”83 then that forces Nietzsche into a position where
he has no choice but to assert his view as an absolute, regardless of the type of truth he is
attacking. Nietzsche observes the dangers of absolute conviction in his later works, and even
points out how science, the new epistemic trend, is wary of convictions: “only when they decide
to step down to the modesty of a hypothesis, a tentative experimental standpoint, a regulative
fiction, may they be granted admission and even a certain value in the realm of knowledge” (GS
344). In my mind, perspectivism, according to a perspectivist, is a hypothesis that advocates
hypothesizing (or anti-foundationalism, as Clark would have it),84 while perspectivism according
to a non-perspectivist (i.e. metaphysical realist, transcendental idealist, someone who does not
adhere to the internal rules of perspectivism, etc.) is a conviction that advocates hypothesizing.
The latter interpretation results in internal inconsistency and contradiction, while the former does
not.
Philosophers may not be able to resist the temptation of interpreting perspectivism as a
conviction (that is, something held with a great deal of certainty or absoluteness) because of
Nietzsche’s polemical style, and because they are distracted by his attacks on absolute truth. It is
possible for one to be “passionately provisional;” theoretical physicists would certainly qualify
as “passionate provisionalists.” Moreover, given Clark’s developmental evidence, one might
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argue that the man couldn’t have held his own ideas as conviction given that he changed and
elaborated his position on the falsification thesis over time: his final position on truth may have
been inspired by his own acts of trial and error, or observing his own perspectival shifts.
Nietzsche himself admits something to this effect, as mentioned earlier in the paper: “Deeply
mistrustful of the dogmas of epistemology, I loved to look now out of this window, now out of
that; I guarded against settling down with any of these dogmas, considered them harmful - and
finally: is it likely that a tool is able to criticize its own fitness?” (WP 410). Additionally, a
number of scholars agree (beginning with Kaufmann) that Nietzsche’s stylistic pluralism is
another facet of his perspectivism: “it is one of his essential weapons in his effort to distinguish
himself from the philosophical condition as he conceives it, while at the same time he tries to
criticize it and to offer alternatives to it.”85 As to whether or not we can take his ideas more
seriously than a “midnight dorm-room bull session,” I think Nietzsche’s work demonstrates a
need for progression in epistemology, which has only taken a few steps beyond metaphysical
realism. Even science still has need of a will to truth, which he sees as, “hostile to life and
destructive…a hidden will to death” (GS 344). Our will to truth, or our passionate drive to seek
out objective truth, is a product of our will to power (i.e. our own interests and needs) that is
destructively self-suppressing: the will to truth is a passion that pursues the dispassionate, a selfimposed (or culturally imposed) will to death, likely preluding what Freud would later call “the
death drive.” Nietzsche wants to demonstrate that this will to death is not necessary to pursue
truth, so long as truth itself is no longer treated as an objective thing we must strive towards;
rather, we can (and perhaps we must) shift our moral ground and treat truth as the object of
passionate engagement and subject to self-authorship.
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VI. Conclusion
We have now seen how two scholars take Nietzsche’s concerns seriously in order to
arrive at a coherent interpretation of his position on truth. Clark takes Nietzsche’s call for a
historical sense very seriously in her writing, and Lanier Anderson explores the naturalistic
elements of perspectivism while carefully keeping Nietzsche’s aversion to dogmatism in mind.
While a number of scholars will take issue with the finer details of Clark’s developmental
argument, many peer reviewers of Clark’s work find Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysical
realism to be highly plausible.86 87 Given the strength of the neo-Kantian interpretation, one
could say that Nietzsche’s perspectivism and discussion of truth prelude the work of a number of
postmodern Anglo-American thinkers.88 For instance, Cornel West points out that like Richard
Rorty, Nelson Goodman, and Thomas Kuhn, Nietzsche believes that facts are always theoryladen,89 and he predates Goodman’s pleas for a pluralism of versions of the world as manifest.90
I would also venture to say that Nietzsche’s implicit perspectival shifts prelude and broadly
parallel Kuhn’s discussion of paradigm shifts. Nonetheless, whether or not a scholar is
examining his epistemology, his ethical doctrine of eternal return, or his will to power, he or she
will undoubtedly find that the whole of Nietzsche’s work calls for a philosophy of life, a
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philosophy that is concerned with the here and now, the living thing-for-itself, as opposed to the
“dead” thing-in-itself that lies beyond our experience. Although Nietzsche is considered among
the forefathers of existential and phenomenological thought, I hope that the broader analytic
community reconsiders their attitudes towards Nietzsche’s place in their philosophical tradition
and appreciate his relentless questioning of foundations, which I believe has been the guiding
force of philosophy since Socrates, if not the guiding force for all thought.
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